Author: Lewis Loflin
Before September 11, 2001, I corresponded with a young man in Egypt, whose father was Egyptian and mother Lebanese. He was a student at a Muslim university in Cairo, which I later learned was known for its conservative Islamic teachings—what some might call “traditional” Islam, a term he himself used. His perspective offered a unique window into the challenges facing the Islamic world, challenges that remain relevant today.
Amid discussions of globalism and multiculturalism, we rarely hear from young people in the Islamic world about their views. Here in the U.S., those who critique open borders and corporate globalism are often labeled as isolationists. I wondered how this young man might be perceived in his own society. He was proud of Islam but also deeply troubled by the Islamic world’s struggles with poverty, technological lag, and military setbacks, particularly against Israel. He once remarked, looking at his cell phone, “Why can’t Muslims build something like this?”
We lost contact after 9/11, but I often think of him and hope he’s doing well. His concerns highlight a critical issue: can the Islamic world compete globally without undergoing significant cultural shifts that might challenge traditional Islamic identity? This question deserves honest discussion, free from ideological bias.
Historically, Muslim-majority nations have faced significant social and economic challenges, which cannot be attributed solely to colonialism. The Ottoman Empire, as early as the 18th century, recognized its lag in science, technology, and civil administration compared to the West, as noted by historian Bernard Lewis in The Crisis of Islam (2003, p. 28). The Ottomans, once a formidable imperial power, struggled to modernize without adopting Western practices, which they often viewed as incompatible with Islamic principles.
For example, when the Ottomans encountered a superior Venetian galley, they sought religious approval to replicate its design, reflecting a broader reluctance to adopt “infidel” technology. The first printing press in a Muslim nation appeared in Turkey in 1729, but its use was limited, and book production remained low—a trend that persists today (Lewis, p. 28). Similarly, Taqi al-Din, appointed chief astronomer by Sultan Murad III in 1571, built an observatory comparable to that of Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe. Yet, on the advice of the Chief Mufti, the Sultan ordered its destruction, signaling a broader rejection of scientific advancement (Lewis, p. 80). By the 13th century, scientific progress in the Muslim world had largely stalled.
Communication with the West was also limited, as many Muslims avoided learning European languages to prevent “infidel contamination.” Instead, they relied on Jews, Greeks, and Armenians—often the most educated and productive members of Ottoman society—to bridge this gap.
The Ottoman Empire’s economy, heavily reliant on slavery, extortion, and poll taxes on non-Muslims (referred to as Kafirs), weakened as they lost territory in Southeastern Europe and Russia. As non-Muslim populations diminished due to migration, conversion, or decline, the empire struggled to find alternative economic models. The Barbary Pirates’ white slavery and piracy operations were halted in the early 19th century by the U.S., and later, France occupied Egypt under Napoleon, with the Ottomans unable to resist. The British ban on the African slave trade in the 19th century further eroded Islamic commerce.
Today, some attribute the Islamic world’s economic struggles to Western influence, but internal factors play a significant role. Low productivity, high birth rates, and educational disparities contribute to ongoing challenges in countries like Iraq and Syria. For instance, a Syrian farmer with two wives and 12 children lost his farm to drought and ended up in a refugee camp before the civil war, illustrating the strain of overpopulation and resource scarcity.
Lewis highlights stark economic disparities: in 2003, Muslim-majority Turkey (64 million people) had a GDP ranking 23rd globally, between Denmark and Austria (each with 5 million). Indonesia (212 million) ranked 28th, behind Norway (4.5 million), and Saudi Arabia (21 million) followed, largely due to oil wealth (Lewis, p. 116). Without oil, Saudi Arabia’s economic standing would likely be far lower. The GDP of all Arab countries in 1999, including oil, was $531 billion—less than Spain’s $595.5 billion.
Education and innovation remain significant hurdles. The United Nations reports that the Arab world translates just 330 books annually, one-fifth of Greece’s total (Lewis, p. 116). Since the 9th century, the Muslim world has translated as many books as Spain does in a single year. A 2000 World Bank report notes that the average annual income in Muslim countries from Morocco to Bangladesh was half the global average. In scientific output, frequently cited papers per million people in 1987 were minimal: Egypt (0.02), Saudi Arabia (0.07), and Kuwait (0.53), compared to the U.S. (42.99), Switzerland (79.90), and Israel (36.63).
Israel’s GDP is 12 times that of Jordan and 13.5 times that of Egypt, and the Arab world’s non-oil exports are less than Finland’s. Declining oil prices since 2016 have exacerbated these economic challenges, with Saudi Arabia financially supporting Egypt to counter the Muslim Brotherhood, especially as Egypt’s tourism-driven economy suffers from instability.
My young Egyptian friend recognized these issues over two decades ago. Turning around deeply rooted cultural patterns that resist learning and innovation is a daunting task, especially when stable governance and manufacturing capabilities lag—sectors increasingly dominated by East Asia. Education levels in these countries are unlikely to improve significantly if talented individuals continue to emigrate.
The future appears challenging for the Islamic world, with economic and social issues potentially fueling further instability. The West should approach these realities thoughtfully, perhaps reevaluating relationships with these nations to encourage self-directed progress, while avoiding further conflict. A more nuanced understanding of these cultural and historical dynamics is essential for fostering constructive dialogue and solutions.
Reference: The Crisis of Islam by Bernard Lewis (2003).
Acknowledgment: I’d like to thank Grok, an AI by xAI, for helping me draft and refine this article. The final edits and perspective are my own.
